



Australian Government
Department of Agriculture

National arrangements for emergency animal diseases

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What is biosecurity?

A set of measures taken to prevent the entry to or to minimise the effects of a disease on a population of susceptible animals

Biosecurity measures can be enacted at the national, state/territory, industry or individual enterprise level.

Biosecurity usually relies upon the implementation of a range of complimentary measures

Case study on disease recognition

- Monday morning at an export abattoir
- On plant vet called to the lairage to inspect a group of pigs
- Depressed, reluctant to stand
- Some have ulcerations on snouts



Questions

- What would the on plant vet do?
- Would they notify anyone?
 - If so, who and how?
- What else would they do?
- Who would conduct the initial investigation?
- What is the area technical manager's role in the incident?

Questions

- How would animals at the abattoir be managed?
- When would culling be considered?
- Who would make that decision?
- Would other consignments be accepted?
- What advice would be given to workers on cleaning and disinfection?

Based on experience from Cheale's abattoir in the UK FMD 2001 outbreak

Return to an Address of the
Honourable the House of Commons dated
22 July 2002 for the

Foot and Mouth Disease 2001:
Lessons to be Learned Inquiry Report

Chairman, Dr Iain Anderson CBE

Presented to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs, and the devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales

Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed
22 July 2002

LONDON: The Stationery Office

HC 888

£10.00

- Some attributed lesions to 'reaction to disinfectant'
- Vet notified the UK State Veterinary Service.
- Suspected FMD or swine vesicular disease.
- Abattoir under quarantine orders that morning.
- Culling completed 30 hours later.

General surveillance in Australia

- Matthews Report (2011):

‘There is still a strong possibility that an incursion of FMD may not be readily detected.’

- Animal Health Committee General Surveillance Working Group (2012):

‘[It] could take several weeks or longer for an FMD incursion to be notified’


- Several initiatives are underway to review Australia’s animal health surveillance requirements
 - Livestock biosecurity network
 - Enhance general surveillance strategy
 - National significant disease investigation program

Role of abattoirs in animal disease surveillance?


- What role do on plant vets and meat inspectors play in Australia's surveillance systems?
 - Screw worm fly, FMD, anthrax, CSF, ASF, TSEs
- Can we use the data from abattoir surveillance better:
 - to monitor levels of endemic disease?
 - national sheep health monitoring project
 - to support cases for disease freedom?
 - sheep abattoir surveillance program
- Are there any impediments to using abattoirs to get samples for future active surveillance programs?

Remember negative information is as valuable as evidence of infection for trade purposes

National decision making in animal health emergencies



State/Territory Framework – EADs



Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Diseases (CCEAD)

Coordinates the national technical response to emergency animal disease incidents

- provides the technical link between the Commonwealth, states, territories and industry for decision making during animal health emergencies
- Chaired by the Australian CVO
- CVOs of the states and territories, technical experts from AAHL, industry signatories to EADRA, Dept of Health & Dept of Environment
- Animal Health Australia and Wildlife Health Australia are observers

National Management Group (NMG)

National group overseeing coordinated emergency responses

- Decide on cost sharing (if invoked)
- Make decision on policy and financial advice after technical advice from CCEAD
- Chaired by Secretary of Dept of Agriculture
- CEOs of state/territory DPIs and peak industry bodies.

State Co ordination Centre (SCC)

Responsible for coordination of state-wide response and investigations outside the initially infected area (Restricted Area)

- Objectives:
 - Develops a Response Plan for approval by CCEAD and NMG
 - Strategic planning and finances
 - Develop, implement and coordinate control activities in the state
 - Coordinate disease investigation, tracing, surveillance and movement controls outside the Restricted Area
 - Liaise with CCEAD, national, state and territory authorities
 - Brief state minister and department executive
 - Communications

Local Control Centre (LCC)

Responsible for operations to eradicate and control disease inside the Restricted Area:

- Operates under policies determined by the state control centre, consistent with the response plan
- Objectives:
 - Identify source of infection
 - Conduct surveillance (identify outbreaks)
 - Eradicate known outbreaks
 - Control spread by implementing movement controls, culling, tracing of contacts, decontamination, vaccination* etc
 - Cooperation and communication with industry and community
 - Record keeping
 - Report to State Control Centre

Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA)

- EADRA is a formal, legally binding agreement on cost sharing for disease responses
- Includes Australian government, state and territory governments, Animal Health Australia, and 14 livestock industries
- Direct costs of response only are covered:
 - salaries and wages
 - operating expenses
 - capital costs
 - compensation for destroyed livestock etc.

Disease categories in EADRA

	Criteria	Example	Cost-sharing	
1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Predominantly affect humans and/or environment •May have limited impact on livestock 	Rabies	Govt Ind	100% 0%
2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Have major socio-economic impacts •Have severe livestock production losses 	FMD, H5/H7 HPAI	Govt Ind	80% 20%
3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Significant but moderate socio-economic impacts •Severe livestock impacts •No human health or environmental impacts 	Clinical blue- tongue in sheep	Govt Ind	50% 50%
4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Mainly cause production losses •Some socio-economic impact 	Bovine TB, pseudo- rabies	Govt Ind	20% 80%

Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan (AUSVETPLAN)

- a series of technical response plans that describe the proposed Australian approach to an emergency animal disease (EAD) incident
- provide science-based policy guidelines and a planning structure

Disease Strategies	Operational Procedures Manual	Enterprise Manuals	Management Manuals	Guidance Documents
Strategies for all EADRA diseases	e.g. Decontamination, Destruction, Disposal, valuation and compensation	e.g. Saleyards and Transporters	e.g. Control Centre Management Manuals (Parts 1&2)	e.g. Premises Classifications

When a suspected emergency animal disease is reported

Owner, private veterinarian or OPV notifies authorities of suspected clinical signs (helicopters won't necessarily descend from the sky)

- **State/territory** - responds by visiting the property and applying necessary measures (such as quarantine). State CVO notifies:

- **Australian CVO** (within the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF)).

- **Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Diseases** - If necessary a national response is commenced, coordinated by DAFF

- confirms the EAD (after diagnosis)

- agrees an EAD response plan (based on **AUSVETPLAN**)

- advises **National Management Group** of EAD response plan and indicative cost

- National Management Group

- based on advice by CCEAD, approves the EAD response plan and through this activates cost-sharing (**EADRA**).

- **Department of Agriculture** notifies the OIE and trading partners

Lessons from past outbreaks (1)

Exotic, emerging and emergency diseases do occur

- Pigeon paramyxovirus type 1
- Avian influenza
- Abalone herpes-like virus
- Newcastle disease
- Australian Bat Lyssavirus
- Hendra virus
- Screw worm (human case)
- Epidemic anthrax
- Equine influenza

Consider exotic, emerging and emergency diseases in differential diagnosis lists

Lessons from past outbreaks (2)

Impacts extend beyond the affected industry

Equine influenza in 2007:

- **Impacts on owners**
 - caring for sick animals
 - loss of income leading to reduced self-esteem
 - enforced or self-imposed social isolation
- **Impacts on other industries**
 - loss of income
- **Impacts on government**
 - loss of income, trust
 - diversion of resources from other activities

Lessons from past outbreaks (3)

Diseases don't read text books

- Propagating epidemic of **anthrax** in Victoria in 1997
- **FMD** in Japan 2010: vet called to the index property initially for milking buffalo with diarrhoea

Hence recognise and report the unusual, but not necessarily a 'text book case'

CSF outbreak in 1960-1

- Disease very mild
- Detected through carcass condemnations and mortality





Figure 1—Sydney-Newcastle Quarantine Area, North Coast Protected Area. Dots in squares represent the approximate locations of swine fever outbreaks outside the Sydney-Newcastle Quarantine Area.



Take Home Message

- **On plant vets and ATMs are integral to our surveillance systems for emergency animal diseases**
 - If they see something unusual or unexpected, EADs should be considered in the list of differential diagnoses.

